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Abstract
This special issue deals with the phenomenon of the emergence of radical violence in what might
be called ‘shatter zones’ of empires after the end of the First World War. It argues that the
emergence of violence was due to the absence of functioning state control and facilitated by the
effects of experiencing mass violence during the First World War. In the multi-ethnic regions of
the former empires, the rising wave of nationalism directed this violent potential against ethnic
and religious minorities.
The collapse of multi-ethnic empires towards the end of the First World War ushered
in a new wave of conflicts. During the period 1917–23, the dissolution of the
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires was often accompanied by violent
attempts to forge new nation-states or to consolidate revolutionary gains through
force. Hundreds of thousands of people, mostly civilians, were caught up in this wave
of violence. Typically, the violence was concentrated in ethnically or religiously
diverse regions or areas, mostly former imperial borderlands, as these culturally
heterogeneous ‘shatter zones’ of multi-ethnic empires often posed a threat, either real
or perceived, to the project of realigning territories as parts of an integral nation-state.1
This special issue will analyse this wave of violence in its broader European context.
Julia Eichenberg, Centre for War Studies, Department of History, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2,
Ireland; eichenbj@tcd.ie. John Paul Newman, School of History and Archives, Newman Building,
University College Dublin, Belfield Campus, Dublin 4, Ireland; johnpaul.newman@ucd.ie. The ideas
underpinning this special issue originated in the context of the project ‘Paramilitary Violence after
the First World War, 1917–23’, based in Dublin and funded by the Irish Research Council for the
Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) and the European Research Council (ERC).
1 The analysis of borderlands as ‘shatter zones’ was introduced into recent historical discussion by the
interdisciplinary and international research project, ‘Borderlands: Ethnicity, Identity, and Violence in
the Shatter-Zone of Empires since 1848’ (2003–7), at the Watson Institute for International Studies
at Brown University, co-ordinated by Omer Bartov. The term has also been used in reference to the
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We consider transnational patterns of violence and similarities or dissimilarities with
respect to victims and perpetrators, as well as the intensity and manifestations of
violence.
Along with this comparative approach, the issue explores this history
diachronically, by suggesting that 1918 did not mark the cessation of violence in
the areas under examination, but rather assigned a new phase of an ongoing conflict.
Frequently, these post-war clashes drew on men, experience and weaponry of the
First World War. Many combatants who engaged in these conflicts perceived their
struggle as a continuation of the war or of the issues that it had raised but not settled.
In order to locate the causes and the nature of this transformation (or continuity)
from wartime to post-war violence, the articles contained in this issue discuss the
role of veterans of the First World War in ethnically or culturally motivated violence
in the period 1917–23. By concentrating on men who had been involved both in
officially sanctioned ‘legitimate’ combat during the war and in violence which could
be described as paramilitary or ‘parastatal’ thereafter, the articles contribute to our
understanding of the differences and similarities between the two. Because of the
imperial history of the men and the areas in question, ‘para-state’ is suggested here
as a useful definition of extra-military forces which considered themselves to be
‘proto-national’ armies fighting to establish their own nation-state.2
The special issue focuses on violence exercised by unofficial or quasi-official
formations that utilised military force usually monopolised by the state. The power
vacuum left by the demise of multinational empires acted as a catalyst for violence.
This dissolution both encouraged its emergence and allowed it to assume a new
tenor. It encouraged violence because it motivated paramilitary and para-state groups
to enforce a new order to replace the old, and also because the lack of imperial
monopoly enabled new and less restrained forms of violence. Typically, this violence
was ethnically motivated, as different ethnic or religious groups who had previously
lived together would turn on each other in a struggle to create an integral and
homogeneous nation-state.
Having established this distinction, the editors propose that while ‘legitimate’
warfare was in some ways more efficient and on a larger scale, paramilitary and para-
state violence was more intense, characterised by a blurring of distinctions between
‘legitimate’ and ‘non-legitimate’ targets, and carried out by men who were typically
more ideologically motivated than soldiers of a regular army. This violence was
eventually and in most cases reined in by regular military or state authorities, but it is
a subsequent hypothesis of the editors that in this process of ‘taming’ irregular soldiers,
post-imperial nation-states also internalised their violent or extreme ideology, and that
this ideology was frequently manifested in native fascist or radical right movements
in the inter-war period.
post-1918 period by Donald Bloxham; see Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (Oxford University
Press, 2009), 81 ff.
2 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, ‘Introduction’, in Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War,
1917–1923 (forthcoming).
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The end of empires
The four contributions to this special edition are each concerned with the waves of
violence that followed the demise of the Romanov, Habsburg, Ottoman and German
empires over the period 1917–23.3 While not exactly a domino effect, the successive
falls of these empires and their eventual replacement by modern nation-states – or
in the case of the Soviet Union, a modern ‘ethno-federalist’ state4 – are part of
the same historical process, a process related to the ultimately overwhelming strains
of waging total war. However, a clear line of demarcation exists between wartime
violence conducted by centralised imperial authorities and the paramilitary and para-
state violence of 1917–23. The articles that follow show both that the breakdown of
imperial and state authority created a power vacuum which came to be contested by
violent actors and groups and that the absence of state control of military and political
power freed those actors from pre-war and wartime restraints and controls. The result
was the creation of a violent milieu of imperial ‘shatter zones’, which transcended
pre-existing state and political borders and in which a number of paramilitary and
para-state actors with a variety of conflicting ideological visions and programmes
fought for control.
Nevertheless, in the context of shatter zones of empire, there is a distinction
between the German and British empires, on the one hand, and the Romanov,
Habsburg and Ottoman empires, on the other. In the three last examples, ethnic
conflict arises in large part due to the dissolution of the imperial polity as
such. In the Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman empires authority rested on a
supranational dynastic principle, and in these cases the violence of 1917–23 was
sufficient to undermine this authority. The aftershocks, therefore, were experienced
apocalyptically. On the other hand, such a supranational dynastic authority had never
been the goal or self-justification of the British and German empires in Catholic
Ireland or in Poland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In these regions,
violence was related not to the dissolution of imperial authority, but rather to a
reconfiguration and an accommodation of territorial losses and resistance of ethnic
minorities. The eruptions of violence caused by the disappearance, shifts or retractions
of imperial authority, which are linked to, but are separate from, the experience of
waging total war, are what we term ‘aftershocks’.
Since these articles are concerned with the end of conventional, regular warfare
and the subsequent emergence of paramilitary violence, the period under study
3 For a comparative survey of the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Russian empire, and the Ottoman
Empire beginning with the outbreak of the war, see Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of
Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914–1923 (London: Routledge, 2005). For a study
of the violent aftermath of the collapse of the Hohenzollern empire, see Robert Waite, Vanguard of
Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Post-war Germany 1918–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1952).
4 On the particularities of the Soviet case see Richard Pipes,The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism
and Nationalism 1917–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), and Ronald Grigor Suny
and TerryMartin, eds.,AState of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford
University Press, 2001).
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begins not with the fall of the Russian Romanov dynasty in March (February, OS)
1917, but with the Bolshevik seizure of power in November (October, OS) that year.
This is the point at which a monopoly on the political and military control of the
territory of the former Russian empire ceased to exist, not to be restored until some
time after the Bolshevik victory in the civil war.5
In terms of the subsequent collapse of European empires, the significance of this
revolution extends beyond the territories of the former Tsarist regime and informs
much of the argument and analysis of the contributions to this issue. The immediate
withdrawal of the Russian army from the war dramatically changed the face of the
Eastern Front,6 creating a chaotic scramble for control in these regions, which would
become a crucial theatre in the subsequent civil war. In addition to this, the apparent
success of the Russian workers’ and peasants’ revolution provided both something to
work towards and something to work against for numerous paramilitary groups during
1917–23.7 The possibility of a transnational Leninist revolution created a violent
dynamic of revolution and counter-revolution in Europe, a dynamic which resulted in
Red andWhite waves of terror in places such as Bavaria, Berlin, Austria andHungary.8
The Bolshevik revolution also set in motion a chain reaction which hastened the end
of the war and contributed to the demise of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern empires.
The release fromRussian captivity of hundreds of thousands of Austro-Hungarian and
German prisoners of war at the end of 1917 as part of the Bolshevik withdrawal from
the war, destabilised both the Hohenzollern and Habsburg empires. Over the course
of 1918, these ‘returnees’ arrived back home, many refusing to re-enlist in the army,
and some even joining armed bands in rural areas of central Europe.9Austria-Hungary
became caught between the exhaustion of its subjects, their unwillingness to continue
fighting the war and the increasingly mettlesome nationalities problem, eventually
succumbing in October 1918 and disintegrating into what would eventually become
the ‘successor states’: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and (an
enlarged) Romania.10 The Hohenzollern dynasty fell at the same time, the failure of
5 The authors, following the practice usually followed in Western works, have set the end of the Russian
Civil War as spring 1921 and the introduction of the New Economic Policy. Violence and aftershocks
of war and revolution, however, continued until the end of the period under study, and beyond. See
Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (London: Haverill Press, 1995), 343–81.
6 The standard military history of this front is still Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (London:
Penguin, 2008). See also Alon Rachamimov, POWs and the Great War: Captivity on the Eastern Front
(New York: Berg, 2002).
7 Inspiring the activity of numerous communist parties in east–central Europe; see, e.g., Ivo Banac and
Bela Kiraly, eds.,War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. 13: The Effects of World War One: The Class
War after the Great War: The Rise of the Communist Parties in East Central Europe 1918–1921 (New York:
Brooklyn College Press, 1979).
8 On revolution and counter-revolution see Arno Mayer, Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe 1870–
1956 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), and Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and
Russian Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
9 See Benjamin Ziemann, War Experiences in Rural Germany 1914–1923, trans. Alex Skinner (Oxford:
Berg, 2007), and Ivo Banac, ‘“Emperor Karl has become a Comitadji”: The Croatian Disturbances of
Autumn 1918’, Slavonic and Eastern European Review, 70, 2 (1992), 284–305.
10 On the collapse of Austria-Hungary seeOscar Jaszi,TheDissolution of the HabsburgMonarchy (University
of Chicago Press, 1929); Arthur J. May, The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy 1914–1918 (Philadelphia:
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the spring offensives in 1918 being a decisive turning point, as was the failed levée
en masse later that year.11 As Richard Bessel notes, ‘the war had bankrupted the old
regime in every sense: militarily, politically, financially, and morally’.12
Slightly adrift from these events in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, unlike the
Hohenzollern, survived the initial shock of its defeat and occupation in 1918.
Nevertheless, ideological currents which were transforming the political landscape of
Europe also impacted on this state. For example, the rising tide of nationalism in the
empire’s Balkan possessions, itself an important trigger of the war, had culminated in
the first Balkan war of 1912, an event which had, according to Aviel Roshwald, served
as an ‘object lesson in the power of nationalism’,13 a lesson which was taken to heart
by the Committee of Progress and Unity (the ‘Young Turks’), in power in Istanbul
from 1908 onwards. Unlike other nationalist movements during the war, however,
the Young Turk government had been unable to resolve the tension between a ‘Pan-
Turkist’ (that is to say, Turkish ethnic nationalist) reorganization of the empire and
the need to hold together the empire’s various ethnicities in order to continue the
war effort.14 The defeat of 1918 resolved this tension, creating the conditions for the
nationalist revolution from 1919 to 1923, based on the military successes of Mustafa
Kemal. Those successes enabled the new Turkish state to renegotiate, in 1923 (with
the Treaty of Lausanne), the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Sevres, imposed on
the Ottoman rump state in 1920.15
A history of violence
The historiographical discussion of violence has revived over the last decade. A
majority of the discussion ostensibly dealing with violence actually discusses social
developments and changes linked to violence, and the acts of violence themselves
are often under-explored. Sociologists rather than historians reintroduced into the
academic discussion the topic of violence as an important issue.
Moreover, and significantly, state violence is undisputedly the centre of attention
of historic research. Explaining the occurrence of mass violence in the twentieth
century has raised a discussion that centres on the question of modernisation and
evolving societies. Some argue that mankind evolves and becomes less violent by
modernisation, leaning on the thoughts of Norbert Elias on civilisation.16 History
in this sense would be seen as a continuous process of suppressing the human drive
for violence. However, many take the history of the twentieth century as the best
proof of the fact that violence does not decline with modernity. On the contrary, and
University of Philadelphia Press, 1966); Z. A. B. Zeman, The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire 1914–
1918: A Study in National and Social Revolution (London: Octagon Books, 1961).
11 On the German levée en masse see Michael Geyer, ‘Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate
about a Levée en Masse in October 1918’, Journal of Modern History, 73 (September 2001), 459–527.
12 Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 45.
13 Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism, 106.
14 Ibid., 185.
15 Ibid. See also Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University Press, 2002).
16 Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
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especially with reference to the key subjects of historical research of mass violence –
Stalinism and the Holocaust – many believe that violence in fact has increased in
modernity. Reasons for this might be manifold. Zygmunt Bauman argues that the
roots of modern violence lie in the fact that modern man is no longer subject to
divine rules. The ‘modern gardener state’ introduced by Bauman as an analytical
category contained, he claims, the destructive potential of modernity.17 However,
while there are grounds for this explanation when applying it to the Holocaust, not
all national case studies might be explained this way. Some of the worst excesses of
violence in the twentieth century, as Jörg Baberowski has pointed out, took place far
from regions of urban settlement. In these cases it is not the modern gardener state
but in fact exactly its absence that facilitates the emergence of brute force, which
allows ‘scrupulous perpetrators to realise their destructive and belligerent fantasies’.18
It is these cases of violence in the absence of state control that the present issue
wants to address. While the topic has raised lively discussion in political science,19 it
is still quite a recent subject of history.20 In order to discuss violence it is important to
recollect the very basics: violence is a very precise physical experience, during which
physical and/or psychological pain is inflicted by human beings on their fellow men.
Michael Geyer has drawn attention to the fact that violence involves the physical
acts of (threatening) harm as well as the emotions that are aroused by the act or by
its threat. People are ‘initiated into violence: they hear of it, think of it, before they
encounter it’.21 This is especially true for violence in the period after the First World
War. Violence had been introduced into the lives of individuals, both victims and
perpetrators of the emerging para-state violence, over the course of the previous years
as an impending threat and as a physical reality, but also through myths of heroism.
These first encounters deeply influence the emergence of para-state violence after
the First World War. In this regard, the authors engage with reflections on the theory
of ‘brutalisation’ (George Mosse) of societies after 1918. The case studies presented
in the following articles stress the impact of the First World War experience and the
continuities represented especially in the form of ex-servicemen becoming involved
in para-state violence, but they also argue against stretching this argument too far.
The war changed the perceptions of violence not only among the former combatants
but also in entire societies, thereby raising potential for violence especially among
a younger generation that never experienced the violence of the World War, only
17 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
18 Jörg Baberowski, ‘Gewalt verstehen’, Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, 5, 1
(2008), 5–17.
19 E.g. Research Centre for Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood (SFB 700), Freie Universität
Berlin.
20 Stathis N. Kalyas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Robert
Gerwarth, ‘The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria
and Hungary after the Great War’, Past and Present, 200 (2008), 175–209.
21 Michael Geyer, ‘Some Hesitant Observations Concerning “Political Violence”’, Kritika: Explorations
in Russian and Eurasian History, 4, 3 (2003), 695–708, 696.
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its myths. While myth-making and narration often helps to overcome effects of
violence,22 in this case it also facilitated its continuation.
Nationalism and ethnicity
In the ethnically mixed border regions of former empires this violence, encouraged
by a rising radical nationalism, specifically turned against ethnic and religious
minorities. The following articles are therefore concerned with questions of ethnic
violence, defined as an action aimed at physically harming people chosen according
to an ‘ethno-rational friend–enemy scheme’,23 in a political context of national
independence movements.
The link between nationalism and the promotion of national homogeneity and
the rise of ethnic violence is a crucial question for the period. The authors engage
with such questions as how far the violence committed after the First World War
was ethnically or politically motivated and how far political modernisation, as has
been claimed, is indeed a precondition for this kind of violence.24 All case studies
feature ethnic-national patterns of inclusion and exclusion, prominent specifically in
border regions, which appear less as zones of mixed population than as regions of
exclusion and distinction.25 The following case studies also help to prove the point
that major changes in the political and economic organisation of a society lead to
changes regarding the forms of violence.26
Closely related to the demise of empires and paramilitary and para-state violence
during 1917–23 is the increasingly influential role played by nationalists and by
nationalism as a political force in our area of study. Nationalism here is taken to
mean a political programme whose goal is the formation of a nation-state as the
alpha and omega of territorial sovereignty and political legitimacy.27 It is clear that,
with the significant exception of Russia, nationalist forces were in the ascendancy
in the ‘post-imperial’ period and that, by 1923, nationalist programmes had been
successfully consolidated throughout east–central Europe (by the formation of the
successor states to Austria-Hungary) and in the former Ottoman Empire (by the
Kemalist republic).28
Much of the violence studied in these contributions arises from this process of
consolidating national revolutions in formerly imperial lands. This is because, as
22 Ibid., 697.
23 Andreas Wimmer and Conrad Schetter, ‘Ethnische Gewalt’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan,
eds., Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002), 313–
329, 314. See also Trutz von Trotha (ed.), Soziologie der Gewalt (Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie, Special Issue 37) (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997).
24 Wimmer and Schetter, ‘Ethnische Gewalt’, 317.
25 Ibid., 318.
26 Michael Hanagan, ‘Gewalt und die Entstehung von Staaten’, Internationales Handbuch der
Gewaltforschung (2002), 153–76, 156.
27 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester University Press, 1982), 1–35.
28 On the successor states see C. A.Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe: AHistory (London:Macmillan,
1962). On the Kemalist republic see Bernard Lewis,The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University
Press, 2001).
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Rogers Brubaker has noted in relation to the Balkan region from 1875 to 1924,
the period in which we are interested was part of the ‘high noon of mass ethnic
nationalism, undertaken by states bent on shaping their territory in accordance with
maximalist – and often fantastically exaggerated – claims of ethnic demography and
committed to molding their heterogeneous populations into relatively homogeneous
national wholes’.29 Key here is the conflation between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ notions
of nationality. While the latter notion is based on an inclusionary, voluntarist
understanding of the individual’s relationship with the state, based on political and
legal rights and obligations, the former is defined through an exclusionary notion
of kinship in which members are bound through cultural factors such as language,
religion, common descent and so on.30 State-building during 1917–23 – the goal
of many paramilitary and para-state groups – was usually based on this exclusionary,
ethnic concept of nationality, identifying non-members as potential or actual enemies.
In this way, paramilitary and para-state groups saw the removal or destruction of other
ethnic groups as a necessary stage in forging a national revolution. This frequently
violent process is now referred to as ‘ethnic cleansing’, a term first used during the
Serbian–Croatian war of 1991–5, and meaning the ‘rendering of an area ethnically
homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons
from another ethnic or religious group’.31
This ethnic dimension of violence during 1917–23 is essential for explaining the
behaviour and motivations of paramilitary and para-state groups in the region. It is
also entangled with the violent dynamic of revolution and counter-revolution and
the political dimensions of violence during the period. In many cases paramilitary
groups blurred distinctions between the politics and ethnicity of their targets, for
example associating Jews with the ‘red menace’ of Bolshevism.32
Legitimacy
Terror is . . . the form of government that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all
power, . . . remains in control.33
29 Rogers Brubaker, ‘Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18, 2 (1995), 194.
30 See Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 10–11.
31 Robert M. Hayden, ‘Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers’, Slavic
Review, 55, 4 (1996), 732. See also Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-
Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
32 Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol. 1: Women, Bodies, Floods, History, trans. Stephan Conway, in
collaboration with Erica Carter and Chris Turner, foreword by Barbara Ehrenreich (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1985), Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol. 2: Male Bodies, Psychoanalyzing
theWhite Terror, trans. Chris Turner and Erica Carter, in collaboration with Stephan Conway, foreword
by Jessica Benjamin and Anson Rabinbach (Cambridge: Polity Press, in association with Blackwell,
1989); also Robert Gerwarth, ‘The Central European Counter-revolution: Paramilitary Violence in
Germany, Austria, and Hungary after the Great War, Past and Present, 200 (August 2008), 175–209.
33 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Allan Lane, 1970), 55.
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All our case studies share the assumption that violence emerges in regions beyond
or otherwise without state control or an effective state monopoly of power at the
edges of the former ancien régime empires. The question of emerging violence is
therefore linked to the question of legitimacy. Violence is by definition a structurally
illegitimate form of power, ‘based on nothing but its sheer facticity’. The dissolution
of all restraints and norms is such an expression of the lack of legitimacy. In rare cases,
however, it may become legitimate, if the violence is popularly accepted as a political
means.34 The articles discuss how far a climate of collective fear, instability and loss of
orientation creates a psychological disposition that leads to excessive violence. They
also address the extent to which the abolition of state control dissolves any restraints
towards employing violence.35 In the middle of a dissolution of the integrity of social
bodies, and faced with the total insecurity that this break-up produces, ‘the threat
of death (executed with spectacular cruelty when it occurs) is the main bond that
holds societies together’.36 This special issue therefore aims to make a contribution
understanding the ‘complex interplay of long-term conditions, short-term triggers,
and cultural collective mentalities in the origins of excessive violence’ that Jaeger
describes as one of the ‘biggest challenges of historical research’.37
Finally, Michael Geyer gets to the heart of this issue’s interest when he points out
that
The question is not or no longer who is right (and hence uses force) and who is wrong (and hence
uses violence). Rather, it is the more fundamental question that defines sovereignty: who has the
right over life and death and who does not. If the contentions of the past concerned issues of
legality (who is right and who is wrong), the new concern is over legitimacy (who has rights and
who has none).38
This is particularly true in the shatter zones under discussion here. The disappearance
of imperial authority also meant the disappearance of pre-existing forms of legality.
The struggles over the newly emerging national states rephrased questions of
legitimacy in a violent way. Paramilitaries, warlords and criminal gangs were among
those who were now in a position to decide ‘who has rights and who has none’,
often to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities.
Summaries
As the following articles show, these common characteristics of violence emerging
in shatter zones of empires may take different forms: violence in the face of a lack
of state control may arise in form of organised criminality and banditry; para-state
control may be established by warlords or by paramilitary forces.
34 Friedrich Jaeger, ‘Der Mensch und die Gewalt. Perspektiven der historischen Forschung’, in Jürgen
Straub, ed.,Was ist der Mensch, was Geschichte? Annaeherungen an eine Kulturwissenschaftliche Anthropologie
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2005), 301–24, 311–12.
35 Ibid., 313.
36 Geyer, ‘Political Violence’, 701–2.
37 Jaeger, ‘Der Mensch und die Gewalt’, 314.
38 Geyer, ‘Political Violence’, 707.
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Joshua Sanborn shows how the collapse of the tsarist regime in Russia and the
subsequent Eurasian civil war created the conditions which allowed the rise of violent
paramilitary entrepreneurs, practitioners of violence (most often veterans of the Great
War) who were also experienced in organizing, coercing and controlling civilian
populations. The unrestrained nature of the violence carried out by these paramilitary
actors was also closely connected with the breakdown of political authority and
(especially) military discipline towards the end of 1917. The author eschews an
interpretation of this violence that emphasises the political struggle between the
Bolsheviks and their enemies. Instead, he considers ‘warlordism’ as a phenomenon
that can be explained in the broader context of state collapse in the period after the
Bolshevik revolution. Just as the October Revolution triggered the civil war and the
rise of such warlords, the Bolshevik consolidation of power and reconstruction of
the state and army from 1923 ultimately restored order and ended the rule of the
warlords. The rise and fall of these paramilitary actors was, in the final analysis, due
to the absence and restoration of state control. Sanborn also discusses the impact
of the war experience on the forms of violence committed, the most significant
example being the controlling and shaping of the civilian population. Disputing the
all-too-easy dualism of ‘White’ and ‘Red’ terror, his article portrays the complexity
of violence in revolutionary Russia.
Julia Eichenberg’s contribution shows how, as with warlords in the Russian civil
war, the absence of a centralised state authority with a monopoly on violence allowed
new, less inhibited paramilitary groups to operate in parts of Ireland and Poland.
While the nature of the former British and German empires differed, the struggle
for independence in Ireland and Poland showed many similarities. Comparing the
Irish and Polish cases, the author discusses the question of ‘shatter zones’ as applicable
to these very different regions on the edge of Europe. The author discusses social,
political and religious motives both for mobilisation in paramilitary formations and
in their choice of targets. Her article concentrates on excesses against civilians rather
than combat situations. It sheds light both on the perpetrators and their heritage of
war experience, and on the victims and the change in acts of violence. Eichenberg
argues that certain forms of the violence committed had a symbolic meaning and
served as a message, further alienating the different ethnic and religious communities.
Finally, the comparison serves to raise questions about the obvious differences in the
excesses in Poland and Ireland, namely in terms of the scale of excesses and victims
and in the question of antisemitism that is central to the Polish case.
In his study of the ethnic Laz minority in Istanbul and the role played
by the criminal underworld in the transition of the former Ottoman empire
into the modern Turkish national state, Ryan Gingeras shows how a sometimes
fraught accommodation existed between crime kingpins and nationalist forces. This
accommodation was based on the relative ability of each group to wield violence and
the desirability of working together to achieve their respective goals. The seeds
of this alliance were planted by the Young Turk government and strengthened
during the First World War, as Laz kingpins consolidated their control over various
suburbs of greater Istanbul. However, Gingeras’s contribution also demonstrates that
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the long-term effects and significance of this alliance between criminal gangs and
Turkish nationalists long outlasted the post-war, post-imperial period, as prominent
individuals and groups in the Istanbul underworld continued to wield influence and
authority long after the cessation of violence. Gingeras shows how the ‘aftershocks’
period in Anatolia, while an important historical turning point, needs to be related
to the larger context of what the author terms ‘the Young Turk period’ in Anatolian
history, which spanned the first half of the twentieth century. His article also calls for
a more global perspective in the study of gangs and paramilitary groups and their role
in the formation of modern states. While the authority of Ibraham’s clan and Ikhsan
Sekban, two of Gingeras’s examples, was ultimately subordinate to the authority of
the nationalists, it is clear that the phenomenon of paramilitary violence in modern
state formation across the globe is a topic that requires further research.
Finally, John Paul Newman’s contribution looks at the various responses from
Habsburg South Slavs, especially Croats, to the demise of Austria-Hungary in 1918
and the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes soon after,
and the way in which former Habsburg subjects made the transition from empire
to (Yugoslav) nation-state. Newman’s analysis focuses on the peasant unrest in the
Croatian countryside during autumn 1918 (briefly rekindled in 1920, and put down
on both occasions by the Serbian army) and the role played by a small number
of radical ‘Bolshevised’ ex-soldiers returning from Russia in fomenting socialist
revolution, as well as that of ex-Habsburg officers of Croatian descent in trying
to roll back the Serb-dominated Yugoslav state and gain national autonomy for
Croatia. The article shows that while national affiliation was important to Habsburg
South Slavs at the end of the First World War, institutional affiliations must also
be taken under consideration. Newman’s contribution also shows that although the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was not the site of such violent revolution
and counter-revolution as elsewhere in central Europe, there nevertheless existed
radical paramilitary groups whose goals can only be understood in the context of
paramilitary and para-state violence elsewhere in the region.
Conclusion
By the end of our period the reconstruction of centralised state power throughout
east–central Europe and within the Soviet Union and the Turkish republic had,
to a greater or lesser extent, taken place. Because of this, paramilitary and para-state
violence of the kind considered by our contributors had either subsided or completely
disappeared. Nevertheless, it is clear that the period 1917–23 should not be placed in
parenthesis, nor should it be seen as merely a violent intermission following war and
the collapse of state authority. The contributions to this special issue also show the
way in which the violence of this period defined the structure of the new, post-1918
states and their relation to minorities and their neighbours. It is also clear that the
violence of this period was often inscribed in the states which emerged from the ashes
of the great empires. At one level, this was true in so far as paramilitary and para-state
personnel active in this period were absorbed into regular military formations and
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even politics after 1923. In other cases, structural relations between violent non-state
actors and the state itself were never entirely separated following the alliances forged
during 1917–23. In yet other cases, non-state groups opposed to the inter-war status
quo possessed an important prehistory which dated back to the violent conditions
at the end of the war and the ideological aspirations of their members during this
period.
A direct comparison of the four case studies that follow stresses the analytical value
of the ‘shatter zones’ of empires as regions specifically prone to a sudden rise of
violence. While the development of nationalism and the question of minorities vary,
all the case studies feature typical characteristics of ‘aftershock’ violence emerging
in shatter zones: (i) the collapse of the imperial state created a power vacuum as
the traditional authorities were unseated or overthrown, were liable to the process of
unseating or a coup, or were for different reasons no longer capable of exercising their
power; (ii) the collapse of the imperial state and the subsequent power vacuum led
to the dissolution of the state security apparatus and to the loss of a state monopoly
of violence; (iii) this dual vacuum of state power and of state control of violence
facilitates the emergence of structures and groups that usurp the control of both
power and violence; (iv) these formations pursue their own interests, frequently
employing brute force and violence, while often considering themselves as a para-
state or even pre-state (preceding the new political and social order) force; (v) as
shatter zones of empires characteristically feature an ethnically and religiously mixed
population, the spiral of violence ignited by these forces usually takes the form of
purges; and (vi) the violence can usually only be stopped by the establishment of a
new state monopoly of the use of force and violence.
